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State Variation in Railroad Wheat Rates
by Michael W. Babcock, Matthew McKamey, and Phillip Gayle 
Wheat	 shippers	 in	 the	Central	 Plains	 states	 have	 no	 cost	 effective	 transportation	 alternative	 to	
railroads.	 Wheat	 produced	 in	 these	 areas	 moves	 long	 distances	 to	 domestic	 processing	 and	
consumption	locations	or	to	ports	for	export.		Wheat	shippers	in	the	Great	Plains	don’t	have	direct	
access	to	barge	loading	locations	and	trucks	provide	no	intermodal	competition	for	these	movements.	
Wheat	 shippers	 in	Montana	 and	North	Dakota	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 rail	 transport	 because	
they	are	distant	from	barge	loading	locations	and	intra-railroad	competition	is	 limited.	In	North	
Dakota,	the	BNSF	controls	78%	of	the	Class	I	rail	mileage,	and	in	Montana,	the	BNSF	controls	
94%.		Montana	ships	nearly	100%	of	its	wheat	by	rail.
Unlike	Montana	and	North	Dakota,	 the	BNSF	and	UP	have	roughly	equal	 track	mileage	 in	
Kansas.	The	BNSF	has	44%	of	the	Class	I	rail	mileage	and	the	UP,	55%.		Also,	both	railroads	serve	
the	major	Kansas	grain	storage	and	market	centers.	
A	2010	USDA	study	found	that	in	1988,	Montana	and	North	Dakota	had	the	highest	rail	grain	
revenue	per	ton-mile	of	the	10	major	grain	producing	states.	By	2007	this	was	no	longer	the	case.	
The	overall	objective	of	the	paper	is	to	investigate	railroad	pricing	behavior	for	the	shipment	of	
North	Dakota,	Kansas,	 and	Montana	wheat.	 Specific	 objectives	 include	 (1)	 develop	 a	model	 to	
measure	the	impacts	of	railroad	costs	and	competition	on	rail	wheat	rates	for	North	Dakota,	Kansas,	
and	Montana,	(2)	identify	and	measure	the	major	cost	determinants	of	rail	wheat	prices,	and	(3)	
measure	intermodal	competition	by	comparing	rail	wheat	rates	in	captive	markets	(Montana	and	
North	Dakota)	to	one	with	more	intermodal	competition	(Kansas).	
The	results	indicate	that	there	is	little	difference	in	average	Montana	and	Kansas	rail	wheat	
rates	per	ton-mile.		However,	North	Dakota	average	railroad	wheat	prices	per-ton	mile	are	higher	
than	average	Kansas	rates	per	ton-mile.	
INTRODUCTION
Railroads were the most heavily regulated transportation mode prior to passage of the Staggers Rail 
Act in 1980.  Deregulation gave the railroads a great deal of pricing flexibility that was previously 
unavailable.  Prices between variable cost and 180% of variable cost were not subject to regulatory 
jurisdiction and review.  The Staggers Act set time limits for ICC decisions regarding abandonments 
and mergers.  Thus Class I railroads were able to quickly abandon or sell branch lines that lost 
money.  Mergers reduced the number of Class I railroads from 40 in 1980 to seven today.  
Deregulation has benefited both the railroads and the shippers.  For the rail industry, the average 
rate of return on investment increased from less than 3% in the 1970s to 4.4% for the 1980s, 7.64% 
in the 1990s, and 8.21% in the 2000s (AAR, various years).  The average railroad rate of return on 
the shareholders’ equity rose from 2.44% in the 1970s to 7.37% in the 1980s, 9.51% in the 1990s, 
and 9.38% in the 2000s (AAR, various years).
According to Winston and Grimm (2000), the net annual benefits to shippers were more than 
$12 billion in 1999 dollars in the first decade following passage of the Staggers Act.  Shippers have 
benefited from 20 years of declining rail rates (inflation adjusted revenue per ton-mile) as well as the 
preservation of rural area lines sold or leased to short line railroads (Prater 2010).
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Railroads are important for transporting agricultural commodities from producing regions to 
domestic processing locations and export ports. These shipments involve large scale movement 
of low value, bulk commodities over long distances, and thus rail service is virtually the only cost 
effective shipping alternative available.
According to Prater (2010), nine of the top 10 wheat producing states are more than 150 miles 
from barge transportation on the Mississippi River, which provides the most significant intermodal 
competition to railroads for long distance movements of grain to export ports.  Wheat shippers in the 
Great Plains states have no cost effective transportation alternative to railroads.  Wheat produced in 
these areas moves long distances to domestic processing and consumption locations or to ports for 
export.  Wheat shippers in the Great Plains don’t have direct access to barge loading locations and 
trucks provide no intermodal competition for these movements.
Wheat shippers in Montana and North Dakota are highly dependent on rail transport because 
they are distant from barge loading locations and trucks are not cost effective for long distance 
shipments of wheat. Cutler et al. (2009), found that Montana ships nearly 100% of its wheat by rail.
Intrarailroad competition is limited in both North Dakota and Montana. In North Dakota, the 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) controls 78% of the Class I rail mileage (Table 1). The only 
other Class I railroad in North Dakota is the SOO Line Railroad Company, controlled by the Canadian 
Pacific Railroad. The regional and local railroads are bridge carriers for the Class I railroads and 
thus provide little direct intrarailroad competition. However, depending on the railroad network, 
non-Class I railroads may contribute to intrarailroad competition. For example, in North Dakota, 
the Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western (DMVW) is an affiliate of the Canadian Pacific (CP) but 
it serves areas of the state that the BNSF does also, but not in the CP.  Thus DMVW competes with 
BNSF for these shipments. Also in North Dakota, the Red River Valley and Western (RRVW) is 
an affiliate of BNSF but serves many areas of the state where there is a strong CP presence.  Thus 
RRVW competes with CP for these shipments.  So in essence the regional and local railroads may 
compete on behalf of the Class I railroads.
In Montana, the BNSF controls 94% of the Class I railroad mileage (Table 2).  The only other 
Class I railroad is the Union Pacific (UP) with only 125 miles of track.  Regional operators include 
Montana Rail Link (MRL) with 937 miles of track and Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western Railroad 
(DMVWR).  The regional classification of DMVWR is somewhat misleading as the railroad only 
operates 51 miles of track in Montana.  While MRL operates a large amount of track, it serves as a 
bridge carrier of BNSF and thus doesn’t provide intramodal competition.  The MRL operates and 
maintains the track, but BNSF still owns the mainline.  The DMVWR is affiliated with the CP and 
links into CP lines in central North Dakota.  The local railroads are linked to one or the other Class 
I railroads, and thus provide generally little intramodal competition.
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Table 1: North Dakota Railroad Mileage 2011*
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 1,714
SOO Line Railroad Company (CP) 482
Subtotal 2,196
Regional Railroads
Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western 475
Red River Valley and Western Railroad 540
Subtotal 1,015
Local Railroads
Dakota Northern Railroad 50
Northern Plains Railroad 297
Yellowstone Valley 9
Subtotal 356
Grand Total 3,567
*Figures include trackage rights.
Source: North Dakota Department of Transportation. North	Dakota	Transportation	Handbook, 2012, p 23.
Table 2: Railroads Operating in Montana, 2011
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 2,003 (157 inactive)
Union Pacific 125
Regional Railroads
Montana Rail Link 937
Dakota, Missouri Valley and Western 57
Local Railroads
Central Montana Rail Inc 84
Mission Mountain Railroad 42
RARUS Railway Company 63
Yellowstone Valley 137
Total 3,448
Source: Montana Department of Transportation
86
Railroad Wheat Rates
Table 3: Kansas Railroad Miles Operated 2011
Class I Miles
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 1,237
Union Pacific System 1,535
Kansas City Southern 18
Subtotal 2,790
Regional Railroads
Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 753
Local Railroads
South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 305
KYLE Railroad 417
Cimarron Valley Railroad 183
Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado Railroad 122
Garden City Western 45
V&S Railway 25
Blackwell Northern Gateway Railroad 18
Blue Rapids Railroad 10
Boothill and Western Railroad 10
Missouri & Northern Arkansas 8
Subtotal 1,143
Grand Total 4,686
Source: Kansas Department of Transportation. 2011	Kansas	Statewide	Rail	Plan, pp 38 and 52.
Unlike Montana and North Dakota, the BNSF and UP have roughly equal track mileage in 
Kansas (Table 3).  The BNSF system is 1,237 miles, or 44%, of the Class I rail mileage while the 
UP system is 1,535 miles, or 55%, of the Kansas Class I miles.  Also, both railroads serve the major 
Kansas grain storage and marketing centers (Kansas City, Abilene, Salina, Wichita, Topeka, and 
Hutchinson).  Kansas has one regional railroad, the Kansas and Oklahoma, operating 753 miles 
in central and western Kansas. Kansas has 10 local railroads that collectively operate 1,143 track 
miles, or about 25% of the total Kansas rail system. The major local railroads are the Kyle (417 
miles) serving north central and northwest Kansas, and the South Kansas and Oklahoma Railroad 
(305 miles) serving southeast Kansas. The local railroads don’t compete with UP or BNSF.
Tables 4 through 6 display wheat production for the 2008 to 2012 period by Crop Reporting 
District (CRP) for Montana, North Dakota, and Kansas, respectively.  Between 2008 and 2010, total 
Montana wheat production increased from 164.7 million bushels to 215.4 million in 2010, a gain of 
about 30%. In 2011, wheat production plummeted to 175 million bushels, an 18.8% decline from 
2010, before recovering to 194.8 million bushels in 2012. The north central and northeast CRDs 
are the primary wheat growing areas, collectively accounting for an average of 75.7% of Montana 
wheat production from 2008-2012.
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Table 4: Montana Wheat Production by Crop Reporting District (CRD)1, 2008-2012 
  (Thousands of Bushels)
CRD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average2
Northwest   2,460 2,169 2,736 2,697 2,416 2,496
North Central 82,665           80,762           97,986           88,852           87,501 87,553
Northeast 37,500           51,845           62,732           43,927           67,846            52,770
Central 20,250           19,414           25,255           18,706           19,228            20,571
Southwest   4,375 4,592 4,877 5,045 3,611 4,500
South Central 10,289 9,608 11,381 10,631 8,557 10,093
Southeast   6,921 7,948 7,339 5,112 5,423 6,549
Other - 337 3,054 - 168 1,186
       Total 164,730 176,675 215,369 174,970 194,750 185,297
1 Includes spring wheat, winter wheat, and durum wheat.
2 The column total doesn’t exactly equal the corresponding total row column due to rounding. 
Source: Montana Department of Agriculture, Montana	Agricultural	Statistics, various issues. 
 
Table 5: North Dakota Wheat Production by Crop Reporting District (CRD)1, 2008-2012  
 (Thousands of Bushels)
CRD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Northwest 61,330           75,240           68,133           21,397           74,335            60,087
North Central 32,290           38,190           38,579           22,633           36,363 33,611
Northeast 81,630           66,475           74,045           54,242           69,411            69,161
West Central 14,305           41,400 37,615 20,470 36,755 30,109
Central 30,685           30,540           29,975           17,898           21,843            26,188
East Central 31,535 24,755 27,344 13,920 20,293 23,569
Southwest 15,670           51,290           42,578           22,951           43,320            35,162 
South Central 18,730           28,525           24,115           14,708           23,676            21,951
Southeast 25,025           20,145           19,166           11,639           13,215            17,838
       Total                     311,200          376,560 361,550 199,858 339,211 317,676
1Figures include spring, durum, and winter wheat. 
Source: USDA; NASS, North Dakota Field Office, Fargo, ND. 
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Table 6: Kansas Wheat Production by Crop Reporting District (CRD), 2008-2012 
  (Thousands of Bushels)
CRD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
Northwest 37,485           50,400           48,127           40,250           45,040            44,260
West Central 34,475           48,800 53,220 23,550 42,700 40,549
Southwest 45,250           62,250           68,028           32,700           51,270 51,900
North Central 56,215           55,200           50,187           46,550           49,120            51,454
Central 67,360           62,100 55,630 51,270 62,615 59,795
South Central 85,250           70,150           74,267           60,650           92,990            76,661
Northeast   5,860 6,115 4,368.8 4,320 4,720 5,077
East Central   6,480             4,585           1,655.9             5,330             8,885              5,387 
Southeast 17,625           10,000            ,516.3           11,880           24,860            13,776
       Total                                 356,000         369,600 360,000 276,500 382,200 348,860
Source: Kansas Department of Agriculture, Farm	Facts, various issues 
Table 5 data indicates that North Dakota wheat production rose from 311.2 million bushels to 
361.6 million in 2010, an increase of 16.2%.  In 2011, wheat production dropped 44.7% relative 
to 2010 production before recovering to 339.2 million bushels in 2012, an increase of nearly 70% 
relative to 2011. The northwest and the northeast are the major wheat production regions, collectively 
accounting for nearly 41% of total North Dakota wheat production during the five most recent years 
for which data are available. 
Table 6 contains Kansas wheat production, which remained relatively steady in the 2008-2010 
period, averaging 361.9 million bushels. As was the case for all three states, production plunged 
to only 276.5 million bushels in 2011, a 23.6% decrease relative to the 2008-2010 average. In 
2012, wheat production was 382.2 million bushels, the highest total annual production in the 2008-
2012 period and 38.2% higher than 2011 production. The largest wheat producing CRDs are the 
southwest, north central, central, and south central, that collectively accounted for 68.7% of the 
average total production during the 2008-2012 period.
The overall objective of the paper is to investigate railroad pricing behavior for the shipment 
of North Dakota, Kansas, and Montana wheat. Specific objectives include (1) develop a model 
to measure the impacts of railroad costs and competition on rail wheat rates for North Dakota, 
Kansas, and Montana, (2) identify and measure the major cost determinants of rail wheat prices, and 
(3) measure intramodal competition by comparing rail wheat rates in captive markets (Montana and 
North Dakota) to one with more intramodal competition (Kansas). 
Prater (2010) found that in 1988, Montana and North Dakota had the highest rail grain revenue 
per ton-mile of the 10 major grain producing states. By 2007 this was no longer the case.  While there 
have been many studies of railroad pricing of grain there have been few recent studies comparing 
variation of regional grain rail rates and the possible causes of the variation. Specifically, there has 
been no study of rail pricing behavior in the captive rail markets of Montana and North Dakota in 
the last six years. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Numerous studies discuss railroad industry competition and pricing, providing various degrees of 
competition within the agricultural industry.  Much of the previous analysis investigated the impact 
of deregulation after the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.  However, research interest in the rail industry 
and competition in the agricultural markets continued up to the present. A significant amount of 
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the literature is regional in scope motivated by the fact that regional rail transport networks vary, 
resulting in regional variation in intramodal and intermodal completion.
A large number of studies analyzed changes in agricultural markets following passage of the 
Staggers Act of 1980.  These include Adam and Anderson (1985), Babcock et al. (1985), Chow 
(1986), Fuller et al. (1987) and Mac Donald (1987), (1989a), and 1989 (b).  In general, these studies 
found that wheat rates declined in all corridors in the 1981-1985 period.  Grain rates on movements 
from the eastern Corn Belt (Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio) increased while rates on movements to the 
Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Coast declined by large percentages.
Wilson and Wilson (2001) documented the rail rate changes that have occurred as a result 
of deregulation in the 1972-1995 period. They use a nonlinear regulatory adjustment mechanism 
to represent the effects of deregulation over time with the largest effects occurring shortly after 
deregulation. Over time, the total effects of deregulation continue to reduce rail rates but at a slower 
rate.
The authors found that in 1981, the effect on rates of Staggers was a decrease of 10.6%, 9.9%, 
1.8%, 13.7%, and 8.4% for barley, corn, sorghum, wheat, and soybeans, respectively. These initial 
effects grew over time at a decreasing rate. By 1995, the longer term percent reduction in rates 
resulting from deregulation was 52%, 46%, 55%, 52%, and 42% for barley, corn, sorghum, wheat, 
and soybeans respectively. Thus, rail deregulation had relatively small initial effects on rates but 
eventually converge to larger longer term effects.
Harbor (2008) takes a comprehensive look at competition within the U.S. railroad industry. 
The author found that the further a shipment originates from water competition, the higher the rail 
rates.  Corn shippers located 100 miles from a barge loading point pay 18.5% higher rates than those 
located 50 miles from water.  Soybean shippers 100 miles from water have rates 13.4% higher than 
shipments originating 50 miles from barge loading points.
The author concludes that a movement from a monopoly to a duopoly causes corn rates to 
decline by 23.1% at 25 miles from water, 16% at 50 miles away, and 9.6% at 100 miles from water. 
A movement from a duopoly to a triopoly causes rail rates for corn to decline an additional 14.2% 
at 25 miles from water, an additional 10.1% at 50 miles away, and an additional 5.7% at 100 miles.
Some studies have focused on the issue of railroad wheat rates in the northern Great Plains 
states, especially Montana and North Dakota.
Bitzan et al. (2003) provided insight into inter and intra commodity rail rate differentials 
observed since rates were deregulated in 1981. The study found that the benefits of rail deregulation 
are not distributed uniformly across or within commodities, favoring grain producers in regions with 
higher levels of intermodal competition.
The study concluded that as the number of railroads serving a market decreases or that distance 
to the nearest water competition rises, rail rates increase. Thus, states dominated by a single railroad 
and also distant from water competition will have relatively high rail rates.  The authors found that 
the northern, southern, and central plains states had higher rail rates than the Eastern Corn Belt. 
Koo et al. (1993) examined railroad pricing behavior in shipping grain from North Dakota to 
domestic and export destinations by using an econometric technique with cross sectional data from 
1984 to 1989. 
The authors found that cost factors play an important role in the variation of rates.  Distance, 
volume, and weight per car all have significant effects on North Dakota rail rates.  They also 
discovered that North Dakota’s primary commodities (wheat and barley) experience higher rates 
than corn and soybeans.  They said this is the case since wheat and barley are not heavily produced 
in water competitive regions.   
In 2007, Montana lawmakers appropriated $3 million for research into rail issues facing 
Montana, including rates and service. Cutler et al. (2009) note that Montana is distant from ports 
and population centers and combined with the bulk nature of the commodities means that motor 
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carrier intermodal competition is ineffective.  Thus, 100% of Montana wheat is shipped by rail to 
the PNW (Pacific Northwest).
The authors found that in 2006, Montana wheat shippers paid higher average rail rates on a per 
car basis and a per ton basis than wheat shippers in other nearby states.  The same was true for North 
Dakota.  They also found that the average R/VC ratio for Montana wheat shipments to the PNW 
was 253% in 2006, well above the averages for all other states with significant rail wheat shipments.
However, recent data are inconclusive on whether Montana and North Dakota wheat rail 
rates are higher than other states. Marvin Prater et al. (2010) examined the sufficiency of rail rate 
competition in rural areas and the impact of intramodal competition on rail rates. They found that 
rail competition for grain and oilseeds (soybeans) generally decreased in the 1988-2007 period. 
Also revenue to variable cost ratios (R/VC) increased in most crop reporting districts (CRD) and the 
ratios were related to the number of railroads competing in the CRD.
In the 1988-2007 period, Prater et al. (2010) found that in the case of revenue per ton, Montana 
and North Dakota had the smallest increases of the 10 states evaluated.  Iowa, Nebraska, South 
Dakota, and Kansas had the largest increases.
For revenue per ton-mile, Colorado, Kansas, Indiana, and Missouri had the largest increases, 
while Montana, North Dakota, and Illinois had the smallest increases.  In fact North Dakota revenue 
per ton-mile actually decreased during the 1988-2007 period.
For (R/VC) ratios, the states with the largest increases were Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, and 
Nebraska.  Montana’s ratio remained virtually unchanged.  North Dakota and Indiana had the least 
increase in ratios in the 1988-2007 period.
The USDA (2013) provided average grain and oilseed tariff rates per ton-mile by state, 2006-
2010.  The study calculated the rates for 36 states.  Rates ranged from 2.5 cents (South Dakota) 
to 9.8 (Michigan).  Montana and North Dakota had rates of 3.3 cents and 3.4 cents, respectively. 
Montana had the 7th lowest rate and North Dakota had the 8th lowest rate. In contrast, Kansas had 
the 14th lowest rate at 3.7 cents.  However, rates are not provided separately for wheat. 
MODEL AND DATA 
The model is a variant of the model published in Koo et al. (1993). Equilibrium prices of rail 
transport of agricultural products are determined by the demand for and supply of rail service. 
Demand for an individual railroad’s service (Qd) is a function of the price of the railroad’s service 
(P1), the price of other railroads’ transport service (P2, P3…), the prices of other modes of transport 
(A1, A2…), and other factors affecting the demand for rail transport (S). Thus, the demand function 
is equation (1).
(1) Qd = (P1, P2, P3…, A1, A2, S). 
The supply of a railroad’s service is a function of the price of the railroad’s service (P1), the price of 
other modes transport (A1, A2… ) and cost factors such as distance (d) and shipment volume (v), and 
other variables that affect the cost of rail transport (C).  Thus, the supply function is equation (2). 
(2) Qs = f(P1,…A1, A2, d, v, C)   
In equilibrium Qd = Qs  so equations (1) and (2) can be combined to form the equilibrium condition. 
Thus, the equilibrium price equation for railroad (1) is as follows:
(3) P1 = f ( P2, P3…, A1, A2, d, v, S, C)
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If the prices of other railroads (P2, P3) are defined as intramodal competition (iac) and the prices 
of other modes (A1, A2...) are defined as intermodal competition (ioc), then equation (3) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
(4) P1= f ( iac, ioc, d, v, S, C)
The empirical model for this study is based on equation (4). As discussed above, intermodal 
competition is likely to be minimal for rail shipments of North Dakota and Montana wheat. Most 
of the shipments are long distance movements to Portland, making truck competition ineffective. 
The average distance from Montana origins to barge loading locations is 522 miles and from North 
Dakota origins is 421 miles, rendering barge competition to be non-existent. The BNSF dominates 
the rail industry in Montana and North Dakota, so intramodal competition is non-existent as well. 
Thus, the empirical model is as follows:
(5) RATE = B0 + B1CARWT + B2DIST + B3GVW + B4BARGE + B5DUMMY + ɛi
 RATE - Rail rate in dollars per ton-mile for the shipment
 CARWT- Weight (lbs) of each loaded covered hopper rail car in a shipment
 DIST - Distance in rail miles between origins and export port
 GVW - Total shipment weight in pounds (tons)
 BARGE - Distance of origin to barge loading facilities
 DUMMY - Dummy variable to represent either a Montana or Kansas location, or a North Dakota 
 or Kansas location.  Montana or North Dakota are assigned 1 and Kansas 0
 ɛ - random error term
The dependent variable (RATE) is the rail rate per ton-mile and can be obtained by dividing 
total revenue of the shipment by weight and distance. Calculation is further demonstrated in Table 7. 
Variation in total revenues of the shipment is obtained by varying the number of cars in the train, and 
variation in the distance is obtained by varying the origin of the shipment. The total shipment weight 
(GVW) is obtained by varying the number of carloads in the train and multiplying by the weight 
per car (CARWT). The distance variable (DIST) is the distance from various origins in Montana 
and North Dakota to Portland, Oregon, and from various origins in Kansas to Houston, Texas.  The 
distance of the origin to barge loading facilities (BARGE) is the distance from Montana origins to 
Lewiston, Idaho, the distance from North Dakota origins to Minneapolis, and the distance from 
Kansas origins to Kansas City, Missouri. Variation in CARWT is introduced by assuming various 
car sizes, i.e., 268,000-pound cars vs. 286,000-pound cars. 
Table 7: Method for Calculation for BNSF Rates Per Ton-Mile
(1) Total Revenue of Shipment = Number of cars in the shipment x rate per car.
(2) Weight of the Shipment = Number of cars in the shipment x weight per car. 
(3) Divide (2) by 2,000 to get tons per shipment. 
(4) Divide (1) by (3) to get revenue per ton.
(5) Divide (4) by distance of the shipment and multiply the result by 100 to get revenue 
per ton-mile, expressed as an integer. 
The theoretically expected sign of the distance variable is negative. A large share of railroad 
costs are fixed with respect to distance, such as loading and clerical costs, insurance, taxes, interest, 
and managerial overhead. As these costs are spread over more miles, the costs per mile decrease at 
a decreasing rate, so the change in the rail rate per ton-mile falls as distance increases. 
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The GVW variable reflects (a) the number of cars in the shipment and (b) the weight per car. 
Since the empirical model includes the commodity CARWT, the volume variable reflects the impact 
on rail rates of increased cars in the shipment. Because a large share of rail costs are fixed with 
respect to weight, railroads also realize economies of weight. Thus, the change in rail rates per ton-
mile are expected to decrease at a decreasing rate as volume increases.
Intermodal competition is proxied by highway miles to barge loading locations. Longer 
distances to water access points reduce the feasibility of truck-barge competition for rail wheat 
shipments. Thus, the theoretically expected sign of BARGE is positive since the greater the distance 
to water ports the greater the pricing power of railroads.
CARWT is expected to have a negative relationship to the change in rail rates per ton-mile. 
Because operating costs such as switching costs per car, labor costs, clerical costs, and various other 
costs are fixed per car, these costs per car decrease as car weight increases. Thus the change in rail 
rates per ton-mile falls as car weight rises.
The empirical model is estimated for Montana, North Dakota, and Kansas. For Montana and 
North Dakota, the shipments in the empirical model are from Montana and North Dakota wheat 
origins to Portland, Oregon, for export. For Kansas, the modeled wheat shipments are from Kansas 
origins to the export ports at Houston. Like Montana, intermodal competition is limited in the 
Kansas wheat transport market. The distance to Houston makes truck competition nonexistent, 
and historically only negligible amounts of Kansas wheat have been shipped on the Missouri and 
Arkansas Rivers.  However, unlike Montana and North Dakota, Kansas is served by both the BNSF 
and UP.  The lines of the two railroads are in close physical proximity in many cases, and they have 
roughly the same number of Kansas track miles (1,237 miles for BNSF and 1,535 miles for UP). 
Then intramodal competition is introduced by pooling the data of the three states and inserting a 
dummy variable in the equation for all Montana or North Dakota observations. 
The model is estimated using BNSF rates for wheat movements in Montana and North Dakota 
to Portland and Kansas to Houston. These are believed to be the best data available as it represents 
accurate BNSF shipping charges as of August 2013. The rates were provided by BNSF personnel 
for each respective car type and train size. The BNSF personnel also supplied the rail shipping miles 
from each origin to the port destination. 
As Table 8 indicates, the distance from Montana origins to Lewiston, Idaho, range from a low of 
410 miles (Collins) to a high of 786 miles (Glendive) with an average distance of 519 miles for the 
11 Montana origins. The distance from Kansas origins to Kansas City, Missouri, range from a low 
of 66 miles (Topeka) to a high of 455 miles (Coolidge) with an average distance for the 10 Kansas 
origins of 245 miles. The distance from North Dakota origins to Minneapolis, Minnesota, range 
from a low of 253 (Casselton) to a high of 624 miles (Williston) with an average distance for the 16 
North Dakota origins of 437 miles. Thus, Kansas origins are significantly closer to barge loading 
locations than Montana and North Dakota.
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Table 8: Montana, North Dakota, and Kansas Truck Miles to Nearest Barge Facility
Truck Mileage to nearest barge facility – Montana origins to Lewiston, ID
Glendive 786 Kintyre 678
Harlem 452 Moccasin 463
Collins 410
Pompeys Pillar 597 Average
519Shelby 449
Carter 413.5
Rudyard 511
Grove 467
Chester 486
Truck Mileage to nearest barge facility – Kansas origins to Kansas City, MO
Wichita 197
Wellington 233
Salina 183 Average
Hutchinson 223 245
Garden City 387
Dodge City 345
Concordia 206
Abilene 156
Coolidge 455
Topeka 66
Truck Mileage to nearest barge facility – North Dakota origins to Minneapolis
Grand Forks 313 Scranton 587
Langdon 436 Bernard 352
Casselton 253 Hensler 468
Jamestown 326 Rugby 465
Minot 497 Drayton 357
Bismarck 426 Arvilla 331
Williston 624 Bisbee 459
Bowman 600 Average
Bottineau 501 437
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 9 displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values.  For the Kansas-
Montana model, the mean RATE (revenue per ton-mile * 100) is about 3.5. The mean CARWT is 
276,727 with a minimum of 268,066 and a maximum of 286,000 pounds. The mean distance from 
Kansas origins and Montana origins to Houston and Portland, respectively, (DIST) was about 876 
miles with a minimum of 641 and a maximum of 1,214 miles. The mean of GVW (weight of the 
train) was 19,768,980 pounds with a minimum of 6,164,000 and a maximum of 34,320,000 pounds. 
The mean of BARGE for truck miles from Montana origins to Lewiston, Idaho, and from Kansas 
origins to Kansas City, Missouri, was about 435 miles with a minimum of 66 and a maximum 786 
miles.  The mean of the Montana dummy variable was 0.636.
Table 9 also contains the variable statistics for the Kansas-North Dakota model. The mean 
of RATE was 3.21 and 275,714 for CARWT. The mean of DIST for wheat shipments from North 
Dakota origins to Portland and from Kansas origins to Houston was 1,171 miles, with a minimum of 
641 and a maximum of 1,602 miles. The mean of GVW was 19,429,930 pounds with a minimum of 
6,164,000 and a maximum of 34,320,000 pounds. The mean of BARGE for truck miles from North 
Dakota origins to Minneapolis and from Kansas origins to Houston was 373 miles with a minimum 
of 66 and a maximum of 624. The mean of the North Dakota dummy variable was 0.608. 
The empirical model was estimated using OLS (robust standard errors) and double log 
specifications. Equations were estimated for the Kansas-Montana data, the Kansas-North Dakota 
data, and the Kansas-Montana and North Dakota data for both estimation methods. 
For the OLS estimation (see Table 10) of the Kansas-Montana model, CARWT had a positive 
sign but was non-significant.  DIST and GVW had the expected negative signs and were significant 
at the 1% level. BARGE had the expected positive sign and was significant at the 5% level. The 
dummy variable was negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that average Montana 
wheat rail rates per ton-mile are less than average Kansas wheat rates per ton-mile. 
Table 9: Variable Statistics
Montana-Kansas Model Data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
RATE 3.498 .0527 2.36 4.8
CARWT 276,727.3 9,012.953 268,000 286,000
DIST 875,765 134,459 641 1,214
GVW 19,768.98 11,350.69 6,164 34,320
BARGE 434.598 167.013 66 7.86
DUMMY 0.636 0.481 0 1
North Dakota-Kansas Model Data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
RATE 3.210 0.579 2.36 4.8
CARWT 275,714.3 8,925.925 268,000 286,000
DIST 1,171.216 332.083 641 1,602
GVW 19,429.93 11,741.45 6,164 34,320
BARGE 372.751 135.788 66 624
DUMMY 0.608 0.489 0 1
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Table 10:  Kansas-Montana Model Results
 OLS (robust standard error) Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
CARWT 1.70(e-06) 0.90 0.369
DIST -.0026422 -8.97** 0.000
CVW -.0000335 -25.54** 0.00
BARGE .0005784 2.01* 0.045
DUMMY -0.18895 -3.3588 0.0011
Constant 5.872175 10.87** 0.000
Observations     264
F statistic          162.46
R2       0.74
Root MSE         0.269
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level. 
OLS estimation of the Kansas-North Dakota model (see Table 11) found that CARWT had an 
unexpected positive sign and was statistically significant.  As was the case with the Kansas-Montana 
model, both DIST and GVW had the expected negative signs and were significant at the 1% level. 
BARGE had an unexpected negative sign and was significant at the 1% level.  The dummy variable 
was positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that average North Dakota wheat rates per 
ton-mile are higher than average Kansas wheat rates per ton-mile. 
The results of the OLS estimation of the model utilizing the data from all three states are 
displayed in Table 12. CARWT had the unexpected positive sign but was not significant. DIST 
and GVW had expected negative signs and the coefficients were highly significant.  BARGE had 
an unexpected negative sign and was significant at the 5% level. The Montana dummy variable 
was negative but not significant. In contrast, the North Dakota dummy variable was positive and 
significant at the 1% level. 
Table 11: Kansas-North Dakota Model Results 
OLS (robust standard errors) Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
CARWT 3.63(e-06) 2.21* 0.028
DIST -0.0023879 -14.71** 0.000
GVW -0.0000274 -23.21** 0.000
BARGE -0.0008152 -5.36** 0.000
DUMMY 0.756382 5.71** 0.000
Constant 5.382395 10.98** 0.000
Observations     245
F statistic          322.59
R2       0.86
Root MSE         0.2207
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 12: Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota Model Results 
 OLS (robust standard error) Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
CARWT 2.57(e-06) 1.84 0.067
DIST -0.0018819 -19.67** 0.000
GVW -0.0000273 -27.58** 0.000
BARGE -0.000190 -2.02* 0.045
Montana -0.07775 -1.59 0.113
North Dakota 0.32917 4.48** 0.000
Constant 5.108501 12.87** 0.000
Observations     245
F statistic          287.24
R2       0.79
Root MSE         0.24869
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level.
The empirical results of the double log specification are similar to that of OLS method.  The 
results for the Kansas-Montana dataset are displayed in Table 13. The log of CARWT has a positive 
sign but is non-significant.  Both the log of DIST and GVW have the expected negative sign and are 
significant at the .01 level. Log of BARGE has an unexpected negative sign but is not significant. The 
Montana dummy variable has a positive sign but is not significant, indicating there is no difference 
in average Montana rail wheat rates per ton-mile and average Kansas rates per ton-mile. 
Table 14 displays the coefficients and statistical results for the double log specification of the 
Kansas-North Dakota dataset. Log CARWT has an unexpected positive sign but is non-significant. 
Both log DIST and log GVW have the expected negative sign are statistically significant at the .01 
level. Log BARGE has an unexpected negative sign and is significant at the .05 level. The North 
Dakota dummy variable has a positive sign and is significant at the .01 level, indicating that North 
Dakota average rail wheat rates per ton-mile are higher than Kansas average rates per ton-mile. 
Table 13: Kansas-Montana Model Results
 Double-Log Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
L CARWT 0.116116 0.73 0.464
L DIST -0.55545 -11.77** 0.000
L GVW -0.154434 -24.34** 0.000
L BARGE -0.020705 -1.08 0.279
L DUMMY 0.003313 0.19 0.847
Constant 5.1618 2.57* 0.011
Observations     264
F statistic          200.94
R2       0.72
Root MSE         0.080
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level.
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Table 14: Kansas-North Dakota Model Results
 Double Log Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
L CARWT 0.252022 1.74 0.083
L DIST -0.7512066 -14.65** 0.000
L GVW -0.1332539 -24.08** 0.000
L BARGE -0.276614 -2.03* 0.043
L DUMMY 0.2064771 5.23** 0.000
Constant 4.59084 2.42* 0.016
Observations     245
F statistic          543.94
R2       0.84
Root MSE         0.070
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level.
The statistical results for the double log specification of the Kansas-Montana-North Dakota 
dataset are in Table 15. Log CARWT and Log BARGE both have unexpected signs but neither 
is statistically significant. In contrast, both log DIST and log GVW have the expected negative 
signs and are statistically significant. The Montana dummy variable is positive but not statistically 
significant, indicating no difference in average Kansas rail wheat rates per ton-mile and average 
Montana rates per ton-mile. However, the dummy variable for North Dakota has a positive sign and 
is significant at the .01 level. Thus, North Dakota average rail wheat rates per ton-mile are higher 
than average Kansas rates per ton-mile.  
Table 15: Kansas, Montana, North Dakota Model Results
 Double Log Method
Variable Coefficient t statistic p value
L CARWT 0.200978 1.72 0.086
L DIST -0.612514 -18.88** 0.000
L GVW -0.134345 -28.97** 0.000
L BARGE -0.004035 -0.32 0.751
MT DUMMY 0.0067543 0.41 0.685
ND DUMMY 0.109476 4.47** 0.000
Constant 4.188548 2.79** 0.006
Observations     413
F statistic          484.48
R2       0.78
Root MSE         0.074
**Statistically significant at .01 level. 
*Statistically significant at .05 level.
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In summary, the results for DIST and GVW were very robust across all six models with the 
expected negative sign and statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, CARWT had the 
unexpected positive sign in all models but was non-significant in five of the six models. This could 
be due to a lack of variation in CARWT since the models contained only two car weights (268,000 
and 286,000 pounds). Also, CARWT could be correlated with GVW. The empirical results for 
BARGE were puzzling. It had the expected positive sign and was statistically significant at the 
.01 level only in the Kansas-Montana OLS equation. In the other five equations, BARGE had the 
unexpected negative sign and was statistically significant in three cases, and was non-significant in 
the other two equations. 
CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis of the paper is that the greater intramodal competition in Kansas compared with the 
lack of intra-rail competition in Montana and North Dakota would result in higher railroad wheat 
prices in North Dakota and Montana than Kansas.  The empirical results for Montana don’t confirm 
the hypothesis. In the four equations involving Montana data, the dummy variable for Montana is 
positive but non-significant in two of the four equations and negative but non-significant in another 
case. In one case, the Montana dummy variable is actually negative and significant, indicating that 
Montana average wheat rates per ton-mile are lower than those of Kansas. 
The empirical results for North Dakota are consistent with the expectation that railroad average 
wheat rates per ton-mile are higher than average Kansas wheat rates due to greater intramodal 
competition in Kansas relative to North Dakota.  The dummy variable for North Dakota is positive 
and significant at the .01 level in all four equations involving North Dakota data, indicating higher 
average rail wheat rates in North Dakota. 
The inconsistent results for the BARGE variable permit no conclusion on the impact of 
intermodal competition on railroad wheat rates per ton-mile in the three states. 
Additional research in this area would explore the hypothesis that intramodal competition varies 
within a particular state.  This can be done by measuring intramodal competition by origin county 
or by origin Crop Reporting Districts (CRD), which are regional groups of five to 14 counties. The 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (sum of squared market shares of each railroad in the CRD) would be 
used to measure rail vs. rail competition.  The higher the index the greater the market concentration 
in the CRD. The maximum value of the index is 10,000 when one firm has a monopoly in the 
market.  The index approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of relatively 
equal size.
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